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Although urban problems extend far beyond the welfare system,' policy-
makers persist in linking inner city problems with the Aid to Families With
Dependent Children (AFDC) program.2 Hence, the rhetoric blames teen
pregnancy, high school dropout rates, urban slums, and drug use on the
availability of welfare benefits.' Furthermore, in recent years the recessionary
economy and the impact of reduced federal spending4 on state budgets have
led us to embrace the notion of no-cost solutions to complex problems. In com-
bination, political rhetoric and budget constraints have nurtured the belief that
we can solve the intractable problems of urban decay and poverty by simply
withholding welfare benefits.
Such withholding is not allowed under the state plan requirements of
federal law.5 However, through the use of a technical and seemingly innocu-
ous research provision contained in section 1115 of the Social Security Act,6
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1. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 130-
31 (1992); Thomas Corbett, Child Poverty and Welfare Reform: Progress or Paralysis?, Focus, Spring
1993, at 8 ("Perceptual reductionism-the tendency to assume that part of the population or problem
represent the whole-is a powerful determinant of the character of the public [welfare] debate."); William
Julius Wilson & Kathryn M. Neckerman, Poverty and Family Structure: The Widening Gap Between
Evidence and Public Policy Issues, in FIGHTING POVERTY, WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 232, 252-56
(Sheldon H. Danzinger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986).
2. Tommy Thompson, 77me to Change the Welfare System, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 1992,
at 3B ("As governor of Wisconsin, I have been waging my own anti-socialist revolution against a welfare
system that has devastated once strong and vibrant urban communities.").
3. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Subsidized Illegitimacy, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1993, at A29
("[Tihe only realistic way to attack this cycle of illegitimacy and its associated pathologies is by cutting
off the oxygen that sustains the system: Stop the welfare checks."); Charles Murray, The Time Has Come
to Put a Stigma Back on Illegitimacy, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 7. 1993, at Fl; LAWRENCE M. MEAD,
THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY 1-24 (1992).
4. In fiscal year 1978, federal grants to state and local governments amounted to 17% of all federal
outlays and 3.6% of gross domestic product. By 1989, the grant level had fallen to 10.7% of federal outlays
and 2.6% of gross domestic product. In recent years, these levels have increased slightly. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR
1994, 174 (1993).
5. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. III 1991),
which requires a state's plan to furnish "aid to families with dependent children . . . with reasonable
promptness to all eligible individuals," to prohibit states from varying the categorical eligibility standards
established by the Social Security Act).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (Supp. III 1991).
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the federal executive branch has waived a number of congressionally enacted
entitlement provisions. These waivers have allowed states to reduce or cut off
benefits to thousands of otherwise eligible AFDC mothers and children who
do not comply with prescribed behavior.
Given the sorely inadequate AFDC benefit level,7 additional benefit reduc-
tions are devastating for AFDC families. Numerous studies have shown the
impact of inadequate income on mental health, infant mortality, low-birth-
weight children, skipped meals, malnutrition and its resulting health problems,
and learning/developmental disabilities.'
This Article will document the federal government's relinquishment, in the
name of experimentation, of any obligation to set welfare policy, and the abuse
of section 1115 waivers in terms of both methodology and substantive result.
In Part I, I explore the historical purpose of section 1115, which was to
provide for limited research projects. Parts II and III critique the abuse of
section 1115 through broad-based executive waiver approvals, and show how
these waiver approvals have resulted in wholesale alterations of the AFDC
program by the states. Finally, Part IV focuses on the reasons why unrestricted
state discretion is not an appropriate strategy for addressing welfare policy
concerns.
7. CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, LIVING AT THE BOTTOM: AN ANALYSIS OF
AFDC BENEFIT LEVELs 11-14 (1993) (AFDC monthly benefit levels for a family of three in the 49 con-
tiguous states range from $120 in Mississippi to $633 in Los Angeles, California, all well below the poverty
level).
8. Study of Poor Children Shows a Painful Choice: Heat over Food, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1992, at
A17 (discussing Boston City Hospital study documenting increase in low-weight babies admitted to
emergency rooms in the winter because families have to divert food money to buy fuel); William S.
Nersesian et al., Childhood Death and Poverty: A Study of All Childhood Deaths in Maine, 1976-1980,
75 PEDIATRICS 41, 48 (1985) (finding that children on social welfare programs died of disease-related
causes at a rate 3.5 times that of other children); Edward G. Stockwell et al., Economic Status Differences
in Infant Mortality by Cause of Death, 103 PUB. HEALTH REP. 135, 137 (1988) (gap between rate of infant
mortality in poor and nonpoor families is widening); David Wood et al., Health of Homeless Children and
Housed, Poor Children, 86 PEDIATRICS 858, 862 (1990) (demonstrating high levels of childhood
"morbidity" and ill health in poor children); Steven Parker et al., Double Jeopardy: The Impact of Poverty
on Early Childhood Development, 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1227, 1231 (1988) (finding that low
socioeconomic status increases the risk of contracting cytomegalovirus, which leads to lower IQ scores
and 2.7 times more school failure than in matched controls and noting "[i]n contrast, these outcomes were
not seen for infected infants of middle or upper class backgrounds."); J.S. Chopra & Arun Sharma, Protein
Energy Malnutrition and the Nervous System, 110 J. NEUROLOGICAL SCI. 8 (1992) (linking protein energy
malnutrition, a natural ramification of poverty, to significant abnormalities in motor and sensory nerve
conduction, resulting in learning deficits and behavioral problems).
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I. THE CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE BEHIND EXECUTIVE WAIVERS
OF STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT PROVISIONS
The Social Security Act, enacted in 1935, 9 sets forth specific federal
requirements that each state plan must contain in order to receive matching
federal reimbursement for benefits paid under the AFDC program ° In 1962,
Congress added section 1115 to the Social Security Act, providing:
In the case of any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the judgment
of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of subchapter I, VI, X,
XIV, or XIX of this chapter, or Part A of subchapter IV of this chapter, in a State or
States . . . the Secretary may waive compliance with any of the requirements of section
302, 602, 802, 1202, 1352, 1382, or 1396a of this title, as the case may be, to the extent
and for the period he finds necessary to enable such State or States to carry out such
project . .. .
Thus, this section allows the federal executive branch, through the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 12 to waive
a state's compliance with many federal AFDC13 statutory entitlement pro-
visions in order for the state to run demonstration projects.
Executive waivers, however, are subject to certain restrictions. HHS must
determine that the demonstrations promote the objectives of the AFDC pro-
gram set forth in the Social Security Act. These objectives include "encour-
aging the care of dependent children in their own homes," helping "maintain
and strengthen family life," and helping "such parent or relatives to attain or
9. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
11. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 122, 76 Stat. 172, 192 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315) (redesignated as § 1315(a) in 1977 by Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 404, 91
Stat. 1509, 1562 (1977)).
Congress has also passed numerous specific provisions authorizing demonstration projects of various
types, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(c)(i) (1988) (authorizing waivers of monthly reporting of budgeting
methods to create consistency between AFDC and Food Stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 1315(c)(1) (1988) (authoriz-
ing child support demonstrations which are "designed to improve the financial well-being of children or
otherwise improve the operation of the child support program"); 42 U.S.C. § 1315(d) (1988) (authorizing
AFDC-UP programs testing different definitions of unemployment, and specifically exempting the projects
from being statewide); now obsolete 42 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(l)(A) (1988) (authorizing three public service
employment projects, but stating that only one may be on a statewide basis); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 8015, 103 Stat. 2106, 2465 (1989) (authorizing Minnesota Family
Investment Plan); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 9121, 101 Stat.
1330, 1330-310 (1987) (authorizing Washington Family Independence Program); Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2309, 95 Stat. 357, 850 (1981) (authorizing Work Incentive
Demonstration Programs), but these are beyond the scope of this Article.
12. The Department of Health. Education and Welfare (HEW) was redesignated as the Department
of Health and Human Services in 1980 by the Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. §
3508 (1988). Throughout this Article, I have referred to the agency as "HHS," except when it is
chronologically correct to designate it "HEW."
13. Although § 1115 allows the executive branch to waive the requirement of a number of other federal
programs as well, I will focus on AFDC waivers in this Article.
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retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence
consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection." '4
The limited legislative history of section 1115 suggests that Congress
intended the waivers to support projects testing new methods of administration
and delivery of the program benefits. The report of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee provided:
Projects to be initiated are expected to be selectively approved by the Department and
to be those which are designed to improve the techniques of administering assistance and
the related rehabilitative service under the assistance titles.1
5
The section of the bill that established 1115 waivers was one of three sections
contained under the heading of "Improvement in Administration Through
Demonstrations, Training, and Public Advisory Groups," along with a section
creating an advisory council on public welfare to study the administration of
various programs and a section providing additional funds for training welfare
staff. 16
At the time of enactment, then Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) Abraham Ribicoff summarized the purpose of the waiver, stating that
section 1115 "would make it easier for States to embark on imaginative pilot
or demonstration projects which could lead to improved operations. "17
The focus of the bill was the provision of better services for recipients, not
reduction of benefits."8 Secretary Ribicoff testified to the Administration's
14. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
15. S. REP. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1962.
See also HEW testimony describing the bill to the House Committee: "Experimentation and demonstration
of new methods of administering public welfare more effectively would be encouraged under provisions
of the draft bill." Public Welfare Amendments of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 10032 Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962) (statement of Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary, Department
of Health, Education and Welfare); "We need to make constant efforts to find still more effective ways
of providing welfare services." Id. at 172; "The complex and varied problems of administration of public
welfare programs can be solved only by fresh and imaginative approaches. Provision for waiver of plan
requirements and some further Federal help with financing should serve as incentives to States to venture
out into much needed experimentation with new methods and procedures." Id. at 638 (statement of Barbara
Coughlan, Director, Nevada State Welfare Department).
16. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, pt. B, 76 Stat. 172. Indeed, Part A
of Title I of the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, which contained no language regarding demonstration
projects, covered the improvement of service to reduce dependency. Id. at pt. A.
17. Public Assistance Act of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 10606 Before the Senate Comn on Finance,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1962) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary,
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) (emphasis added).
18. "The Committee on Finance, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 10606) to extend and improve
the public assistance and child welfare services program of the Social Security Act . . . ." S. REP. No.
1589, supra note 15, at 1, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1943 (emphasis added). The Senate Report
stated that this bill would allow waivers for "demonstration projects designed to improve the public
assistance program . . . ." Id. at 1947.
In appropriating additional funds for § 1115 projects in 1967, Congress again stated that the money
was "to develop demonstrations in improved methods of providing service to recipients or in improved
methods of administration." S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2834, 2863; see also id. at 3006 (discussing "ways of improving the quality of administra-
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beneficent intentions in supporting the Public Assistance Act of 1962, which
contained section 1115:
The President in his welfare message to the Congress observed that communities which
have attempted to save money on welfare expenditures through ruthless and arbitrary
cutbacks have met with little success.
[The President] said:
... but communities which have tried the rehabilitative road-the road I have recom-
mended today-have demonstrated what can be done with creative, thoughtfully con-
ceived and properly managed programs of prevention and social rehabilitation, in those
communities, families have been restored to self-reliance, and relief roles have been
reduced.' 9
At the committee hearing, no witness suggested-nor did the Finance
Committee ever intimate-that section 1115 was to be used to reduce benefits
by varying eligibility criteria.20 In fact, the types of limited pilot projects
which were presented to the Finance Committee included those testing the
benefits of better trained caseworkers under competent supervision with
manageable caseloads, those allowing recipients to retain more of their earn-
ings prior to benefit reduction, and those using reduced caseloads and concen-
trated casework to strengthen family life, bring separated parents back togeth-
er, and help welfare recipients get paid jobs.2
tion and to further assist the needy to become self-supporting or better able to care for themselves")
(emphasis added).
19. Hearings, supra note 17, at 109 (statementof Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary, Departmentof Health,
Education, and Welfare); see also id. at 141 (emphasizing that experimentation could improve operations
and streamline administration); id. at 79 (containing Report of Ad Hoc Comm. on Pub. Welfare, to the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (1961) (again promoting efficiency, "new and better methods,"
and integration of services as the goals of experimentation)); id. at 239 (statement of Marvin E. Larson,
member of Board of Directors, American Public Welfare Association) (stating that demonstration projects
could contribute "to the improvement of public assistance administration" but noting that experimentation
is only permitted "under prescribed and limited conditions").
20. HEW's contemporaneous practice supports this point. At the time § 1115 was enacted, HEW did
not consider federal eligibility criteria mandatory on the states and, indeed, had approved numerous state
plans which contained exclusions of women and children who were otherwise eligible under the federal
statutory language. For example, HEW allowed states to exclude children who were suspended from school,
mothers who refused to have a psychiatric exam, and children of mothers who were deemed able to work
although they could not find a job, subject only to the "condition x" standard that the exclusions not be
irrational or arbitrary in light of the Social Security Act's purposes. Edward V. Sparer, The Right to
Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 65, 68 (Norman
Dorsen ed., 1971); see also Matthew Zwerling, Welfare's "Condition X," 76 YALE L.J. 1222 (1967)
(discussing the statutory and constitutional authority for "condition x" and its possible application to
determine the constitutionality of state welfare programs).
Only in 1968 did the Supreme Court find that § 402(a)(10) (a waivable provision under § 1115)
required states to pay benefits to all individuals who were eligible under the federal statutory language.
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 330-33 (1968). HEW disagreed with this opinion and continued for some
years thereafter to argue that states could exclude otherwise eligible recipients subject only to an HEW
determination that the exclusion did not violate "equitable treatment." Sparer, supra, at 68.
21. Hearings, supra note 17, at 312-14 (statement of Joseph H. Reid, Executive Director, Child
Welfare League of America).
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Two further points important to our discussion emerge from the record.
First, Congress appears to have intended that the projects implemented pursu-
ant to the waiver provision be limited in scope. While the AFDC program
requires that the state plan provisions apply statewide,22 the Senate Report
stated that this would need to be waived in most demonstration projects. 23
Second, a later Senate Report indicated that duplication of such projects should
be avoided.24
In short, both the limited legislative history and lack of fanfare accompany-
ing the passage of section 1115 indicate that Congress and the Administration
intended this section to be a narrow, technical, and beneficent research option.
II. FEDERAL EXECUTIVE ABUSE OF SECTION 1115 WAIVERS
Over the thirty years of implementation of section 1115 waivers, HHS
policy has shifted from approval of confined administrative and service-orient-
ed projects to a radical misuse of waivers that has substantially undermined
the federal AFDC eligibility criteria.' In order to do this, HHS ultimately
promulgated regulations that rejected the opinions of leading authorities about
the standard protections that should be employed when conducting research
on welfare recipients.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (1988).
23. "One such requirement, for example, is that the plan be in effect throughout the State. A
demonstration project usually cannot be statewide in operation. For this reason, under the bill the Secretary
would be authorized to waive plan requirements.. . ." S. REP. No. 1589, supra note 15, at 19, reprinted
in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1961.
24. S. REP. No. 744, supra note 18, at 169, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3006.
25. Courts have given wide discretion to the secretary in approving waiver requests and have rejected
the argument that § 1115 waivers could not be granted to "diminish any statutory rights or entitlements."
Aguayo v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 462, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff"d, 473 F.2d 1090, 1104-05 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied. 414 U.S. 1146 (1973) (challenge to New York demonstration project requiring all "em-
ployable" members of families receiving AFDC to register for training and employment and to accept a
referral to a training program, to a job in the public or private sector, or to one established by the
program); Phoenix Baptist Hosp. and Medical Ctr. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 1423, 1427-28 (D. Ariz.
1989) (challenge to Arizona project rejecting the Medicaid reimbursement model, and instead entering into
agreements with four "prime contractors" to receive a flat rate for each indigent person assigned to the
contractor, and in exchange to provide all necessary medical care); Georgia Hospital Ass'n v. Dep't of
Medical Assistance, 528 F. Supp. 1348, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (challenge by Georgia hospitals to Georgia
project implementing an alternative reimbursement system to hospitals for Medicaid); Crane v. Mathews,
417 F. Supp. 532, 539 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (challenge to Georgia demonstration project requiring copayment
for certain Medicaid services to apply to all AFDC recipients except children in foster care); California
Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491, 493-95 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (challenge to the
"California co-payment experiment," requiring Medi-Cal recipients not receiving cash assistance, earning
income in addition to their cash assistance, or possessing resources above certain levels to copay for some
medical services).
In so ruling, however, courts commented on the time-limited nature of the demonstrations and the
fact that the experiments were for a limited group of recipients. Aguayo, 352 F. Supp. at 470; California
Welfare Rights Org., 348 F. Supp. at 498.
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A. Shift in Nature and Scope of Projects Receiving Waiver Approvals
Consistent with legislative intent, HEW's early waivers26 were largely
directed toward administrative innovations to improve the service delivery of
the program or small projects extending social services. For example, between
1963 and 1972, HEW approved at least twenty-five child care development
programs, and more than forty programs to integrate services by coordinating
and expanding social services and various benefit programs. At least twenty
projects involved caseworker training.27
HEW initially stated that the purpose of the waivers was "to develop and
improve the methods and techniques of administering assistance and related
services designed to help needy persons achieve self-support or self-care or
to maintain and strengthen family life. "28 Several years later, HEW reiterated
this purpose and suggested examples of possible 1115 waivers, all of which
involved an expansion of benefits or administrative innovation. According to
HEW, the waiver could help:
provide assistance to needy individuals who would not otherwise be eligible; increase
the level of payments; provide social services not presently available, including such
complementary services as homemaking and home management; experiment with new
patterns and types of medical care; test new approaches to staff development; permit
purchase of services or other financial arrangements when necessary services for needy
individuals are not available in public welfare agencies; or, involve new methods of
improving any aspect of public assistance administration, including administrative
methods, policies, and procedures.
29
Furthermore, in seeking additional funds for section 1115 demonstration
projects in 1967, HEW described the first five years of the waiver authority:
Five years ago, the Congress established a program under the Social Security Act to
support demonstration grants in the area of public assistance. The program has become
a valuable tool for improving welfare services and administration. By January of this
26. HHS was unable to provide the author with original copies of all waiver approvals despite a long-
standing Freedom of Information Act request. However, through other sources I was able to obtain a list
of all waivers approved for 1962-1973, 1981-1985, 1987, and 1989-1992. For the missing years, I have
relied on references to waivers in litigation and scholarly writing, the HHS waiver priorities listed in the
Federal Register from 1978-1983, and conversations with experts who were closely following the waiver
process during the relevant time. I have been able to obtain and review copies of the complete federal
approvals (and in some cases the state applications as well) for many waivers granted for 1985-1992.
27. DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
APPROVED: JULY 1, 1963-JuLY 1, 1972 (1972) (on file with author); DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS BRANCH, DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS IN PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE (SECTION 1115 OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT): PROGRAM AND FISCAL REPORT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1968 (1968) (on file with author).
28. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, H.T. No. 4, pt. IV, § 8421 (1963).
29. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, H.T. No. 109, pt. IV, § 8432 (Feb. 17, 1967).
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year, 164 projects had been approved. Projects supported to date have dealt with more
efficient ways of administering public assistance; tested the effect of administering public
assistance; tested the effect of earned income exemptions as incentives to work; and
experimented with the development of new ways of providing services.'
In the early 1970s, although the vast majority of waivers continued in the
same vein, HEW granted a limited number of waivers that resulted in a
potential loss of benefits for recipients:3" several waivers were approved
allowing states to run demonstrations involving mandatory jobs programs with
AFDC reductions for those who failed to participate.32 Indeed, one demon-
stration was approved which required up to three dollars a month in copayment
for medical care for some recipients.33 However, these projects were
restricted in scope and duration: The California Co-Payment Experiment was
for one year, with a possible six-month extension, and applied only to
individuals with income or resources over a certain limit;34 the New York
Public Service Work Opportunities Project operated in fourteen counties
covering twenty-five percent of the state's AFDC cases for one year;35 the
New York Incentives for Independence Project operated in only three counties,
covering 2.5% of the state's AFDC and state-run Home Relief recipients for
one year.36
Between 1978 and 1983, HHS decided not to promulgate regulations setting
30. Social Security Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 12080 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 271 (1967) (statement of Wilbur Cohen, Under Secretary, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare); see also id. at 1126 (statement of Hon. John V. Lindsay, Mayor, City
of New York) (noting the success of a training program that provided child care to all participants and
suggesting the expansion of child care provision).
31. The unusual nature of these waivers was noted by the court in subsequent litigation of a copayment
project:
It is maintained, essentially without contradiction, that no project which would have resulted in
a lowering of the level of benefits has ever been approved, prior to this California project.
Curiously, there is no showing whatsoever, that any state had ever proposed such a project
before, much less that such a proposal had been rejected by the Secretary.
California Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491, 495 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
32. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SECTION 1115, DEMONSTRATION
PROJECTS APPROVED (1972), supra note 27, at 13 (discussed in Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090,
1094-96 (2d Cir. 1973)).
33. Id. at 2 (discussed in California Welfare Rights Org., 348 F. Supp. at 494).
34. California Welfare Rights Org., 348 F. Supp. at 494-95.
35. Aguayo, 473 F.2d at 1094.
36. Id. at 1095. During this period, HEW also approved waivers for the highly analyzed negative
income tax and income maintenance experiments in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington, Colorado,
Indiana, North Carolina, and Iowa, which guaranteed participants payments bringing their income to a level
expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. These programs drew from a range of populations: some
enrolled single mothers; others focused on working two-parent families. Joseph Heffernan, NegativeIncome
Tax Studies: Some Preliminary Results of the Graduated-Work-Incentive Experiment, 46 Soc. SERV. REV.
1 (1972); Robert A. Moffitt & Kenneth C. Kehrer, The Effect of Tax and Transfer Programs on Labor
Supply, in 4 RES. LAB. ECON. 103 (1981); Felicity Skidmore, Operational Design of the Experiment, in
WORK INCENTIVES AND INCOME GUARANTEES: THE NEW JERSEY NEGATIVE INCOME TAX EXPERIMENT
25 (Joseph A. Pechman & P. Michael Timpane eds., 1975).
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forth standards and procedures for section 1115 waivers," and instead pub-
lished "Federal Register notices annually to inform the public of the kinds of
projects that may be funded under [1115] and the specific requirements and
procedures for making awards."" Prior to 1981, these notices largely limited
priority areas for waiver approvals to administrative initiatives.39
Beginning in 1981, pursuant to specific congressional authority,' the
Reagan Administration began giving large numbers of waivers of the federal
entitlement provision4' to test employment-related activities, including job
search, community work experience, and grant diversion to subsidize employ-
ment. 42 Although welfare-to-work demonstrations constituted the majority of
waivers granted from 1981 to 1987, HHS continued to grant waivers for a
number of administrative projects, including error-rate reduction and coordinat-
ed administration of AFDC and Food Stamps.43
However, in the mid-1980s, consistent with an earlier proposal to distribute
AFDC funds within block grants and convert the program into a wholly state-
run and state-financed effort," President Reagan announced a total revamping
37. Special Section 1115 Demonstration Projects, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 41 Fed. Reg. 5132
(1976); Withdrawal of Notices of Proposed Regulations Formalizing Requirements and Procedures for
Research and Demonstration Grants, 44 Fed. Reg. 18,054 (1979).
38. 44 Fed. Reg. 18,054 (1979).
39. For example, the 1978 priorities included fraud control technique, electronic fund transfer of
benefits to bank accounts, automation of eligibility determination, management improvement, child support
case preparation, state procedures in determining incapacity, and analysis of local welfare office administra-
tion procedures. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,061 (1978); see also 48 Fed. Reg. 21,202 (1983); 47 Fed. Reg. 31,079
(1982); 46 Fed. Reg. 30,895 (1981); 45 Fed. Reg. 31,924 (1980); 44 Fed. Reg. 27,614 (1979). The only
variation from administrative priorities listed in the Federal Register priorities was the implementation of
welfare-to-work demonstrations congressionally authorized in 1981. Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
In addition, a 1980 HHS memo, in describing the types of 1115 projects which would be favorably
considered, reiterated the beneficent intent of the projects:
A general policy of HEW in granting waivers is that the welfare recipient should be as well off
or better off than he would be if there was no project. With this policy in mind, there are sub-
units within Section 402 that the Secretary has authority to waive but does not exercise that au-
thority in order to preserve the rights of recipients.
DIVISION OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE STUDIES, SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., SECTION 1115 INNOVATIVE WELFARE
PILOT PROJECTS-WAIVING PORTIONS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT FOR AID TO FAMILIES WITH
DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND RELATED PROGRAMS (1980) (on file with author).
40. Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1988). Without a waiver of 602(a)(10)(A), the state cannot deny benefits
to individuals who meet these federal requirements. See supra note 5.
42. From 1981 to 1985, HHS approved 41 employment-related waivers. DIVISION OF FAMILY
ASSISTANCE STUDIES, SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., AFDC RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS IN FISCAL
YEAR 1981-85 (on file with author).
43. Seven approved projects tested error reduction methods; five experimented with consolidation of
AFDC and Food Stamps. Id.
44. David S. Broder & Spencer Rich, Block Grant Plan Would Replace U.S. Welfare Payments,
WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1981, at Al. Linda E. Demkovich, Political, Budget Pressures Sidetrack Plan for
Turning AFDC Over to States, 13 NAT'L J. 1671 (1981). This is consistent with the overall conserva-
tive/federalist downsizing of the federal government and decentralization of programs popularized by
conservative think tanks and made prevalent in the Reagan Administration. Robert Rector, Welfare Reform
That is Anti-Work, Anti-Family, Anti-Poor, 603 HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 23, 1987, at
11. For a fuller discussion of Reagan's block grant strategy, see GEORGE E. PETERSON ET AL., THE
The Abuse of § 1115 Waivers
of the AFDC program through "state-sponsored, community-based demonstra-
tion projects. "45 To facilitate this initiative, the Administration redesigned and
simplified the structure of the waiver process,' establishing a Low Income
Opportunity Advisory Board to expedite state requests for waivers of multiple
programs and to recommend action to the secretaries of each relevant depart-
ment.47
The Low Income Opportunity Advisory Board was to consider whether the
waiver request: (1) was consistent with the policy goals set forth in Up From
Dependency, the 1987 report issued by the Domestic Policy Council Low
Income Opportunity Working Group;4" (2) was cost-neutral; and (3) had an
adequate evaluation component.4 ' The evaluation was to measure the net
effect on dependency, i.e., whether people left the welfare rolls, and the cost
effectiveness of the project. Noticeably absent from the evaluation criteria was
any notion of assessing harm to the affected recipients."5 A policy analyst
from the conservative Heritage Foundation stated that "[t]hough the Board has
attracted scant press and public attention since its creation in 1987, it is one
of the most important gains for federalism in recent years."51
One of the first two waivers processed through the Low Income Opportuni-
REAGAN BLOCK GRANTS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? (1986).
45. Ronald Reagan, Address on the State of the Union 6 (Jan. 27, 1987) (transcript available from
the Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc.).
46. Stuart M. Butler, How the White House Spurs Welfare Reform, 705 HERITAGE FOUND.
BACKGROUNDER, May 4, 1989, at 3; Rector, supra note 44, at 11.
47. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE INTERAGENCY Low INCOME OPPORTUNITY ADVISORY BOARD PROCE-
DURES FOR COORDINATION AND REVIEW OF STATE WELFARE REFORM DEMONSTRATION PROPOSALS AND
WAIVER REQUESTS (Nov. 30, 1987) (on file with author).
48. The report of the Low-Income Opportunity Working Group strongly recommended widespread,
long-term state and local experimentation with welfare programs to accomplish very general goals such
as reducing dependency on welfare, encouraging economically self-reliant families, making individualized
determinations of need, and making work more rewarding than welfare. DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL LOW
INCOME OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, UP FROM DEPENDENCY: A NEW NATIONAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
STRATEGY 5, 51-53 (1986). The report specifically put forth the idea of withholding welfare as a means
of controlling behavior:
A centralized system bypasses normal community patterns and support. Federal aid now goes
to individuals and households as a right, regardless of their attachment to any community norms
or standards. Because the community provides no benefits, it can rarely enforce any mutual
responsibility or inspire affections.
Id. at 40.
49. Steven Garansky & Burt S. Barnow, Demonstration Evaluations and Cost Neutrality: Using
Caseload Models to Determine the Federal Cost Neutrality of New Jersey's REACH Demonstration, 11
J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 624 (1992).
50. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 47, at 4.
51. Butler, supra note 46, at 10. Lest we view this as totally a Republican phenomenon, former
Democratic Representative Chester Atkins of Massachusetts echoed similar leanings:
In Washington, the crisis of welfare dependency remains a matter for seminars, panel discussions,
symposia, conferences, hearings and departmental review. But in the states, liberals and conserva-
tives alike are engaged in developing and implementing innovative plans ....
Chester G. Atkins, Prometheus Bound: Democrats in Washington's Era of Limits, Speech to the Heritage
Foundation, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 25, 1986), quoted in DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL Low INCOME
OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 48, at 42; see also 132 CONG. REC. S5077 (1986) (statement
of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan).
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 12:8, 1994
ty Advisory Board 2 signaled a major departure from previous waiver prac-
tice. The Wisconsin Learnfare proposal "sanctioned," or reduced, AFDC
benefits to families in which teenage AFDC dependents and AFDC teen par-
ents failed to attend high school. Rather than establishing proven support
programs to keep kids in school, Learnfare punished welfare families whose
children were truant or dropped out.53 For the first time, a waiver was grant-
ed to allow a reduction in AFDC benefits solely to affect the "deviant" behav-
ior of welfare families outside of a labor market context.
The Bush Administration continued to expand the waiver provision, encour-
aging states to submit waivers so long as they were cost-neutral to the federal
government.5 4 Similarly, President Clinton favors broad state discretion and
flexibility to redesign welfare programs.55 His Administration has approved
numerous waivers,56 including an eleven-year Wisconsin "experiment" which
terminates a family's entire AFDC grant after twenty-four months even if the
parent wants to be in the labor market but is unable to find a job. 7
52. For a summary of waivers processed in 1987-1988 by the Low Income Opportunity Advisory
Board, see Michael E. Fishman & Daniel H. Weinberg, The Role of Evaluation in State Welfare Reform
Waiver Demonstrations, in EVALUATING WELFARE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS 119 (Charles F. Manski
& Irwin Garfinkel eds., 1992).
53. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals,
102 YALE L.J. 719, 726-36 (1992) (discussing how Learnfare fails to meet its articulated goals).
54. See infra part IlI for documentation of waivers granted and infra text accompanying notes 134-38,
for discussion of cost-neutral policy. In his State of the Union address in January 1992, President Bush
signaled that he intended to make processing waivers easier and quicker in order for states to implement
programs requiring welfare recipients "to seek work, education, or job training," "to get their lives in
order," "to hold their families together and refrain from having children out of wedlock," and "to obey
the law." George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 28
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 170, 176 (Feb. 3, 1992). Later in 1992, the Bush Administration set up a
federal interagency review process similar to the Low Income Opportunity Advisory Council "to encourage
States to design and test potential improvements" and "to open Federal research and demonstration activities
up to ... a wide range of proposals" if the demonstration would be rigorously evaluated and would be
cost-neutral to the federal government benefit programs. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 1993 418-20 (1992).
55. President Clinton has stated:
We need to encourage experimentation in the states. I will say again what you know so well: there
are many promising initiatives right now at the state and local level, and we will work with you to
encourage that kind of experimentation. I do not want the federal government, in pushing welfare
reforms, based on these general principles, to rob you of the ability to do more, to do different things.
President Clinton Address to the National Governors' Association, REUTER TRANSCRIPT REP., Feb. 2,
1993. The President said he would approve waivers that he did not necessarily agree with as long as the
experiments were measured honestly. Id. The current Administration has continued the policy that the
projects must be cost-neutral, although they assess cost neutrality over the life of the project rather than
from year to year. U.S. Dep't of Health and Hum. Serv., Press Release, HHS NEWS, Aug. 18, 1993 (on
file with author).
56. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT OF SECTION 1115 AFDC
RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS IN FISCAL YEAR 1993-INFoRMATION (1993) (on file with
author) and infra notes 95, 99, 101 for documentation of waivers granted.
57. Letter from Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department of Health
and Human Services, to Gerald Whithurn, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services
(Nov. 1, 1993) (on file with author) (approving the Wisconsin "Work Not Welfare" demonstration project).
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B. Removal of Protection for Subjects of Experimentation
by HHS's Abandonment of Independent Review
While shifting its section 1115 policy from approval of beneficent demon-
stration projects to executive rescission of congressionally established welfare
eligibility criteria, HHS also eliminated regulations providing for independent
procedural protections normally mandated in research projects to protect
AFDC mothers and children from harm.
In 1971, HEW developed a subregulatory policy to protect human subjects
involved in all of its grants or contracts, including section 1115 projects.58
These protections included a review by an independent committee, subsequent-
ly termed the "Independent Review Board" (IRB), of the institution applying
for any project in which human subjects "may" be at risk.6
In promulgating the policy in the form of regulations in 1974,61 HEW
concluded that requiring that the committee include members who are not
employees of the institution applying for the project "is an essential protection
against the development of insular or parochial committee attitudes, that it
assists in maintaining community contacts, and would augment the credibility
of the committee's independent role in protection of the subject."62 If the
project placed the subjects at risk,63 participation had to be limited to those
who had given legally effective informed consent.' These regulations applied
to "sociological" as well as physical or psychological harm.65 From 1974 to
1983, HEW generally applied these human services protections to section 1115
waiver projects.66
58. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, GRANTS ADMINISTRATION MANUAL, TN 71.6,
chap. 1-40 (April 15, 1971); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE INSTITUTIONAL GUIDE
TO DHEW POLICY ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS, DHEW PUBLICATION No. (NIH) 72-102 (Dec.
1, 1971).
An individual was considered to be at risk "if he may be exposed to the possibility of harm-physical,
psychological, sociological, or other-as a consequence of any activity which goes beyond the application
of those established and accepted methods necessary to meet his needs." GRANTS ADMINISTRATION
MANUAL, supra, § 1-40-10B.
59. The National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348 § 212, 88 Stat. 342, 353 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), with subsequent regulatory revision, 40 Fed. Reg. 11,854
(1975).
60. GRANTS ADMINISTRATION MANUAL, supra note 58, § 1-40-20A.
61. 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914 (1974) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46).
62. 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914, 18,915 (1974) (emphasis added).
63. With no explanation, the final regulations added to the definition of "subject at risk" a requirement
that the potential injury increase "the ordinary risks of daily life." 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914, 18,917 (1974)
(codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46.3(b)).
64. Id. (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46.2(b)(3)).
65. 38 Fed. Reg. 27,882 (1973).
66. See discussion of extensive review and consent in David N. Kershaw, Comments, in Robert M.
Veatch, Ethical Principles in Medical Experimentation. in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL
EXPERIMENTATION 59 (Alice M. Rivlin & P. Micheal Timpane eds., 1975). But see Crane v. Mathews,
417 F. Supp. 532, 545 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare representation
to the court that it "has never resolved the question whether § 1115-type projects should be included within
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However, in 1976, in response to Crane v. Mathews,67 which upheld the
applicability of the protection of human subjects regulations to section 1115
waiver projects, HEW attempted to narrow the group of people protected by
these regulations. In a notice of interpretation of "Subject at Risk," it stated
that the regulations:
were not, and have never been, intended to protect individuals against the effects of
research and development activities directed at social or economic changes, even though
those changes might have an impact on the individual. More particularly, they were not
designed to protect against possible financial injury which may result from alteration in
the price, availability, or conditions of eligibility for benefits or services offered under
a governmental program.6
According to HEW, examples of research projects that would not place
someone "at risk" included ones in which:
some welfare recipients report more frequently than others their income for purposes of
determining their eligibility for, or the amount of, their welfare benefit, or a requirement
that some but not all able-bodied welfare recipients work as a condition of eligibility for
welfare, or a diminution in the level of welfare benefits (within prescribed boundaries)
payable to some but not all similarly situated welfare beneficiaries, or a requirement that
some but not all welfare recipients make a co-payment toward the cost of governmen-
tally-financed medical care .... 6'
The Carter Administration had considered extensively whether to exempt
section 1115 waivers from Institutional Review Board oversight. 70 However,
on January 26, 1981, just as the Reagan Administration was taking office,
HHS expressly decided not to rescind those protections and instead provided
the purview of 45 C.F.R. Part 46," although it had decided that parts of the project in question were within
the scope of the regulations).
67. 417 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
68. 41 Fed. Reg. 26,572 (1976). This interpretation was published two weeks after the decision in
Crane, 417 F. Supp. 532. In that case, HEW granted § 1115 waivers to allow Georgia to test the behavioral
response of recipients to economic disincentives by imposing $2-25 copayments on Medicaid recipients
for doctor's visits. In finding that the project involved human subjects, the court stated:
The Georgia copayment project has the effect of diminishing the amount of money that a family might
have available for basic living needs and forces the family to make a determination whether to apply
that money to basic living needs or to apply it to purchase medical care. Such an activity in which
human beings, defined in the Social Security Act as the categorically needy, are required to pay for
medical care in a situation in which they could not otherwise be statutorily required to pay for such
care and would not otherwise have to apply income to that need, is an activity which "deliberately
and personally imposes" upon those human beings.
417 F. Supp. at 546. The court refrained from reaching the issue of whether the subjects were "at risk,"
but required that the project be submitted to an Institutional Review Board for such a determination. HEW's
subject-at-risk interpretation seems to be either an attempt to influence the judicial or the IRB decision.
Lon Mullen, Human Experimentation Regulations of HEWBar Georgia Medicaid Cutback, CLEARINGHOUSE
R., Aug. 1976, at 259-60.
69. 41 Fed. Reg. 26,572-73 (1976).
70. HEW had proposed an exemption for large scale research on the "effects of proposed social or
economic change," from Part 46 in 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 47,688, 47,692 (1979).
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that an IRB which reviewed a project could waive or modify the informed
consent requirement in certain situations.71 HHS explicitly stated that no
evidence had been presented to support the contention that IRB review and ap-
proval impeded social science research.' Shortly thereafter, HHS confirmed
its position: "We believe that IRB review of such evaluation research involving
human subjects is appropriate even where, and perhaps particularly where, in-
formed consent is not required,"73 and stated that the previous "subject at
risk" interpretation did not apply to the 1974 regulations which required
informed consent for sociological as well as physical harm .74
This affirmation of independent protections for section 1115 research
subjects was in response to the findings and recommendations of two influential
national commissions established by Congress to identify the basic ethical
principles that should underlie biomedical and behavioral government research.
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research had stated:
The Commission's deliberations begin with the premise that investigators should not have
sole responsibility for determining whether research involving human subjects fulfills
ethical standards. Others, who are independent of the research, must share this responsi-
bility, because investigators are always in positions of potential conflict by virtue of their
concern with the pursuit of knowledge as well as the welfare of the human subjects of
71. 46 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1981). The final regulations stated that "IRB review of studies of federal,
state, or local benefit or service program is appropriate even where it may be impracticable to obtain the
informed consent of the subject." 46 Fed. Reg. 8366, 8383 (1981). However, the regulations allowed the
IRB to modify or waive the informed consent requirement if the IRB documented that (1) the demonstration
was of a benefit or service program and the research could not be carried out if consent was required, or
(2) "the research involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects" and "the waiver ...will not
adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects." 46 Fed. Reg. 8366, 8390 (1981) (codified at 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.116(c), (d)).
72. 46 Fed. Reg. 8366, 8370 (1981).
73. Letter from Charles R. McCarthy, Director, Office for Protection from Research Risks, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, to Barbara Mishkin, Deputy Director, President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Feb. 26, 1981), in
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RESEARCH REGULATIONS: THE ADEQUACY AND
UNIFORMITY OF FEDERAL RULES AND OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 174 (1983).
The protections resulting from this procedure became evident in the aftermath of the decision in Crane,
discussed supra note 68. The IRB disapproved the project, determining that a substantial risk of physical
harm existed because poor people would fail to receive medical treatment, that the benefits of the project
did not outweigh the risks, and that the research design was "so seriously inadequate that it would be very
unlikely to provide any accurate or reliable information upon which to base policy decisions regarding
Medicaid copayments." Institutional Review Boards: Report and Recommendations of the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 43 Fed. Reg.
56,174, 56,197 (1978).
74. Letter from Charles McCarthy to Barbara Mishkin, supra note 73. In promulgating the regulations
and incorporating the recommendation of the National Commission, HHS had stated that "minimal risk"
involved "those risks encountered in the daily lives of the subjects of the research," 46 Fed. Reg. 8366,
8373 (1981), thus rejecting the "subject at risk" interpretation of the "normal experiences which other
Americans can expect to encounter in their daily lives." 41 Fed. Reg. 26,572, 26,573 (1976).
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their research."
Subsequently, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Prob-
lems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research stated that an
exemption for "social, economic, or health service research conducted under
governmental aegis" from the requirements of the human subjects regulations
should be granted only when "the research involves no limitation or withhold-
ing of a benefit to which the subjects are legally entitled or which other
individuals, similarly situated, continue to receive under the program being
evaluated. "76
However, only one year later, the Reagan HHS decided to remove all
Medicaid cost-sharing demonstration projects such as the copayment project
involved in Crane v. Mathews from any IRB review. HHS specifically stated
that escalating Medicaid costs required this change.77 Shortly thereafter, HHS
totally exempted all section 1115 projects from an independent IRB review.78
The stated reason was that section 1115 projects were subject to review by
HHS officials anyway and were different from "biomedical and behavioral"
research.'
75. 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174, 56,175 (1978). The National Commission for the Protection of Human Sub-
jects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (established by the National Research Act of 1974, P.L. No.
93-348, 88 Stat. 342), had earlier recommended that HEW require IRB review of "all research involving
human subjects that is subject to federal regulation," 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174, 56,176, Recommendation (1)(A)
(1978), and that informed consent of participants be required and documented whenever anything more
than "minimal risk" is present. Id. at 56,179-81, Recommendation (4). The Commission found that IRB
review is "the primary mechanism for assuring that the rights of human subjects are protected." 44 Fed.
Reg. 47,688, 47,689 (1979).
The Commission's recommendations were later issued as an HEW publication. THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (1978).
76. Letter from Morris B. Abram, Chairman, President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, to Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary,
Department of Health and Human Resources [sic] app. at 5 (Sept. 18, 1980) (emphasis added) (on file with
author).
77. Notice of Waiver, 47 Fed. Reg. 9208 (1982). Although the IRB, following the Crane decision,
determined that a substantial risk was present in even a $2 copayment proposal, supra note 73, HHS stated
that IRB review was unnecessary since "the possibility of any risk arises solely from the modification of
benefits or the means of obtaining benefits" which is "clearly authorized by, and inherent in the concept
of demonstration projects conducted under section 1115." Id. This regulation was immediately circum-
scribed by Congress. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324,
367 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § § 13960 (1988)).
78. 48 Fed. Reg. 9266 (1983).
79. With no evidence to contradict its previous finding, supra text accompanying notes 70-74, HHS
stated that the independent IRB review was duplicative and burdensome, and that eliminating it was
necessary to speed up the approval process. In addition, HHS stated that the ethical questions arising from
biomedical and behavioral research were unnecessary to research changing benefit levels. 48 Fed. Reg.
9266, 9268 (1983).
It has been noted that the HHS Under Secretary at the time had designed the § 1115 California
Medicaid cost-sharing experiment under then Governor Reagan, which was challenged in California Welfare
Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491 (N.D. Cal. 1972), and fully understood the impact of
independent IRB review on broad-based state discretion. Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last:
The Oregon Medicaid Experiment, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 121 n. 117 (1992).
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Rejecting the opinion of the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research that
some form of independent IRB review was necessary,80 HHS stated that only
agency personnel, under an obligation set forth in Appropriations Act riders,"
would review each section 1115 request to determine whether it presented "a
danger to the physical, mental or emotional well-being of a participant."2
The Commission strongly disagreed with HHS's contention that no risks exist
for the people involved in social policy experiments, 3 noting that research
projects covered by the proposed exemption can create medical risks as well
as risk of nonphysical intrusions into personal or confidential matters and that
such risks should be considered by an IRB. s4 Indicative of the need for inde-
pendent rather than solely agency review, HHS has recently taken the position
that, "as a matter of law," demonstration projects that reduce public assistance
do not constitute a danger to welfare families.5
Thus, through both executive encouragement of broad-based and wide-
80. The Commission noted that IRB review was not duplicative of HHS review unless the HHS process
included persons with no interest in the outcome of the research and qualifications for evaluating ethical
aspects of the project. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Comments of the President's Commission on the Department of
Health and Human Services' March 22, 1982, Notice of Proposal to Exempt Certain Research Projects
from 45 CFR 46 (April 21, 1982), in IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RESEARCH REGULATIONS: THE ADEQUACY
AND UNIFORMITY OF FEDERAL RULES AND OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 73, at 177.
81. Each fiscal year appropriation for HHS from 1974 to 1993 included a provision that funds
appropriated to HHS must not be used for:
any research program or project . . . of an experimental nature, or any other activity involving
human participants, which is determined by the Secretary or a court of competent jurisdiction
to present a danger to the physical, mental or emotional well-being of a participant or subject
of such program ... without the written, informed consent of each participant ....
Added by floor amendment offered by Senators Buckley and Biden. 120 CONG. REC. S31,596-98 (daily
ed. Sept. 18, 1974). Most recent provision for fiscal year 1993 contained in Departments of Labor, Health
and Human Services and Education and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-394,
§ 211, 106 Stat. 1812 (1992), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3515b.
In proposing the appropriations rider, Senator Biden specifically stated that the language of the rider
expanded the "coverage of existing HEW regulations to include activities carried out by HEW itself," and
that the requirement of informed consent applied to "any program or project which has been determined
to present a danger to the physical, mental, or emotional well-being of the participant." 120 CONG. REC.
S31,597 (emphasis added). This section has recently been held to apply to projects approved through §
1115 waivers. Beno v. Shalala, No. S-92-2135, slip op. at 21 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 1993) (appeal pending).
82. 48 Fed. Reg. 9266, 9270 (1983).
83. IMPLEMENTINGHUMAN RESEARCHREGULATIONS: THE ADEQUACY AND UNIFORMITY OF FEDERAL
RULES AND OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 73, at 178.
84. 48 Fed. Reg. 9266, 9268 (1983). The Commission recommended that all research projects which
limited or reduced benefits be subject to an independent IRB review. Id.
85. Beno v. Shalala, No. S-92-2135, slipop. at 23. (E.D. Cal. July 1, 1993). This litigationchallenged
the "work incentive" component of a proposed California demonstration project, decreasing AFDC benefit
levels by 1.3%, and waiving limits on earned income (the other component of the project imposed a one
year residency requirement limiting benefits to the amount the applicant would have received in her state
of prior residence; its application was enjoined in Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993)).
While denying the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court rejected HHS's position
that benefit reduction does not endanger recipients, stating that the language and history of the safeguards
for human research subjects in HHS's Appropriations Act and 45 C.F.R. § 46 do not expressly exempt
financial harm from the definition of danger. Id.
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ranging state AFDC experimentation as well as the restriction of independent
protections for the AFDC mothers and children who are the subjects of such
experiments," HHS has turned a carefully regulated federal entitlement
program into a group of highly discretionary state programs.
III. RESULT OF EXPANDED STATE EXPERIMENTATION
The federal government's willingness to approve virtually any cost-neutral
state demonstration project has led to a stampede of such proposals, many of
which result in reduced subsistence benefits for welfare recipients.8 7 These
fall into a number of categories, including Learnfare (reducing benefits if a
child has too many school absences or fails to maintain a certain grade aver-
age), Family Cap (denying increased benefits for additional children conceived
while on AFDC), family planning (requiring Norplant injection as an eligibility
criteria for benefits), immunization (reducing benefits for failure to get children
immunized or to seek regular medical care), migration restrictions (reducing
AFDC benefits for people who move from one state to another),"8 Workfare
(reducing benefits if recipients do not work for their benefits), and across-the-
board AFDC benefit cuts. 89
Viewed as a whole, these programs reveal an extremely disturbing trend-
states using AFDC as a punitive stick to attempt to affect the behavior of
"deviant" welfare recipients, and the federal government indiscriminately
approving section 1115 waivers for other than true experimental projects. The
underlying assumption is that any change in a welfare rule constitutes welfare
reform, and any policy change can be justified as an experiment. By focusing
solely on long-term AFDC recipients9 and erroneously viewing them as the
86. There are, of course, additional difficulties with an internal process-for example, lack of public
notice and opportunity to comment, lack of articulatedand reviewable findings regarding harm to recipients,
but a detailed discussion of those problems is beyond the scope of this Article.
87. Summaries of all waivers in 1991 and 1992 are contained in MICHAEL WISEMAN, THE NEW STATE
WELFARE INITIATIVES 13-18, 30-33 (The Institute for Research on Poverty & The Robert M. La Follette
Institution of Public Affairs, Discussion Paper No. 1002-93, 1993); JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN & MARK GREEN-
BERG, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, THE RUSH TO REFORM: 1992 STATE AFDC LEGISLATIVE
AND WAIVER ACTIONS 1 (1992); CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, REPORT ON AFDC
§ 1115 APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED TO HHS FROM JANUARY 1992-JANUARY 1993 (Pub. No. 169, 1993).
88. Historically, differences in welfare payments have been viewed as a factor contributing to
increasing populations in northern urban slums. Daniel P. Moynihan, The Crises in Welfare, PUB.
INTEREST, Winter 1968, at 3, 28; JAMES TOBIN & W. ALLEN WALLIS, WELFARE PROGRAMS: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 16 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Rational Debate
Seminars, 1968).
89. LEVIN-EPSTEIN & GREENBERG, supra note 87, at 1. The authors also document three areas of
state demonstration that improve benefits: allowing a family to retain more of its earnings when a member
becomes employed, expanding eligibility for certain two-parent families, and reducing the amount of a
stepparent's deemed income when an AFDC parent marries. Id. at 30-39.
90. The median stay on AFDC in 1991 was only 21.9 months. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS/1993 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND
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vast bulk of the urban underclass,91 policymakers view changing the behavior
of this small subgroup as the basis for solving broader societal problems.92
As I have observed elsewhere,93 many of these behavioral modification
programs have little substantive merit. They simply do not work as a mecha-
nism to change welfare recipients' behavior. In addition, many of the demon-
stration projects do not meet the standard social science criteria for the design
and implementation of an experimental program.94
For example, projects have been routinely approved that cover the entire
state AFDC population instead of being limited to the statistically significant
number of subjects needed for an experimental and a control group.9" This
DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 697 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 GREEN BOOK]. Recent state studies have shown that the median stay
on AFDC for new entrants is one year or less, that more than two-thirds of new entrants leave the system
within two years, and that less than 15% of new entrants will receive AFDC continuously for five years.
MARK GREENBERG, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, BEYOND STEREOTYPES: WHAT STATE AFDC
STUDIES ON LENGTH OF STAY TELL US ABOUT WELFARE AS A "WAY OF LIFE" vi (1993).
91. Long-term AFDC recipients living in poverty areas make up only 2.9% of the U.S. poverty
population. Erol R. Ricketts & Isabel V. Sawhill, Defining and Measuring the Underclass, 7 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 316, 319 (1988).
92. Although reducing welfare "dependency" has become the driving force in both the rhetoric and
implementation of welfare reform, very little empirical research has been done to illuminate the causes of
long-term AFDC receipt. STATES UPDATE (Center for Law and Social Policy), Oct. 9, 1992, at 7. While
we know that short-term AFDC mothers are better educated, more likely to have been married, have been
employed more recently, and have not had their first child while a teenager, we know little of what barriers
are faced by long-term AFDC mothers. Douglas J. Besharov, Targeting Long-Term Welfare Recipients,
in WELFARE POLICY FOR THE 1990S, 146, 151-54 (Phoebe H. Cottingham & David T. Ellwood eds.,
1989); DAVID T. ELLWOOD, TARGETING "WOULD-BE" LONG-TERM RECIPIENTS OF AFDC 30, 42, 50
(1986). For example, a study of the 1983-84 National Survey of Income and Program Participation has
indicated that over 20% of female AFDC heads of household under age 45 are disabled, but are not
receiving the more generous disability program, Supplemental Security Income. MICHELLE ADLER, DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH AND DISABILITY STATUS OF AFDC FAMILIES (1988); see also
ELLWOOD, supra at 42-47 (18.4% of recipients report they have a disability which limits work); GREGORY
C. WEEKS, WASHINGTON STATE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, TARGETING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 5 (1992)
(finding that 16% of Washington AFDC recipients reported a disability in the last 12 months).
Likewise, even though many of the state demonstration projects are designed to test ways of moving
recipients into the labor force, a recent Chicago study showed that virtually all welfare recipients are
working already, because they are unable to meet basic subsistence needs with the AFDC grant. The
authors found that "single mothers do not turn to welfare because they are pathologically dependent on
handouts or unusually reluctant to work-they do so because they cannot get jobs that pay better than
welfare." Kathryn Edin & Christopher Jencks, Reforming Welfare, in JENCKS, supra note 1, at 204.
93. Williams, supra note 53.
94. See generally Garansky & Barnow, supra note 49; WISEMAN, supra note 87, at 6-8.
95. For its work-incentive grant reduction project, California has designated 15,000 cases from four
counties as the research sample, including 5000 as a control group and 10,000 as a treatment group. Letter
from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human
Services, to Eloise Anderson, Director, California Department of Social Services app. at 5-6, 3.6-3.7
(Oct. 29, 1992) (on file with author) (granting waiver approval). This constitutes approximately 2% of the
AFDC population of the state. However, all other AFDC recipients in the state have their benefits reduced.
See also Letter from Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department of Health
and Human Services, to James G. Ledbetter, Ph.D., Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human
Resources (Nov. 2, 1993) (on file with author) (granting approval of the Georgia Personal Accountability
and Responsibility Demonstration Project); Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart to James G. Ledbetter (Nov.
17, 1992) (on file with author) (granting approval of the Georgia Preschool Immunization Project); Letter
from Jo Anne B. Barnhart to Carolyn W. Colvin, Secretary, Maryland Department of Human Resources
(June 30, 1982) (on file with author) (granting approval of the Maryland Primary Prevention Initiative Dem-
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is a particularly critical violation of standard procedures 6 when the experi-
ment involves a reduction in subsistence benefits to mothers and children,
many of whom may not meet the necessary qualifications to be part of the
experimental group.9 7
Moreover, rather than testing different hypotheses or different approaches
to addressing the same hypothesis, virtually identical projects have been
approved for multiple states.9" For example, there are currently five approved
projects denying or reducing aid for children born or conceived during the
family's receipt of AFDC,99 two projects that lower benefits for "new" resi-
onstration Project); Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart to Gerald H. Miller, Director, Michigan Department
of Social Services (Aug. 25, 1992) (on file with author) (granting approval of the Michigan To Strengthen
Michigan Families Demonstration Project); Letter from Joseph R. Antos, Ph.D., Director, Office of
Research and Demonstrations, Health Care Financing Administration, Department of Health and Human
Services, to Alan J. Gibbs, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Human Services (July 20, 1992)
(on file with author) (granting approval of the New Jersey Family Development Program); Letter from
Otis R. Bowen, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, to Richard F. Celeste, Governor of Ohio
(June 2, 1988) (on file with author) (granting approval of the Ohio Transitions to Independence Program);
Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart to Stephen D. Minnich, Administrator, Oregon Department of Human
Resources (July 15, 1992) (on file with author) (granting approval of the Oregon JOBS Waiver Project);
Letter from Laurence J. Love, Acting Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department of Health
and Human Services, to Cornelius Hogan, Secretary, Vermont Agency of Human Services (April 12, 1993)
(on file with author) (granting approval of the Vermont Family Independence Project); Letter from Wayne
A. Stanton, Administrator, Family Support Administration, Department of Health and Human Services,
to Timothy Cullen, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (Oct. 20, 1987) (on
file with author) (granting approval of the Wisconsin Welfare Reform Demonstration); Letter from Jo Anne
B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Family Support, Department of Health and Human Services, to Patricia
Goodrich, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (June 6, 1990) (on file with
author) (granting approval of Part II of the Wisconsin Welfare Reform Demonstration).
96. Garansky & Barnow, supra note 49, at 632-33 (discussing stronger evaluation design of smaller
random assignment). "As a matter of principle, it is clear that the Secretary would abuse his discretion
if he were to approve a project ... by either subjecting an unreasonably large population to the experiment
or continuing it for an unreasonably long period." California Welfare Recipients Org. v. Richardson, 348
F. Supp. 491, 498 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
In spite of this, the Bush Administration encouraged states to submit "[wlaiver projects [that] include
almost all of the programs' participants in a State." THE WHITE HOUSE, ADDING RUNGS TO THE LADDER
OF OPPORTUNITY: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY FOR FURTHER WELFARE REFORM 7 (1992).
97. For example, California's grant reduction project is allegedly to test whether reduced benefits and
increased earnings disregard will create a work incentive. However, because the grant reduction is applied
statewide, recipients deemed unable to work by the state welfare department itself will be subject to the
reduced grant, including those who are on AFDC because of a parent's incapacitation (4.6% of AFDC
population). CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERV., AFDC CHARACTERISTICS SURVEY: STUDY MONTH
OF JULY 1992, table 1 (Statistical Services Bureau, Program Information Series Report 1993-03, 1992).
98. While multisite testing may be appropriate where each site is limited in scope and chosen for its
differential value (e.g., rural county, urban neighborhood with strong labor market participation), HHS
has chosen to approve projects at multiple sites with no finding that each site provides additional evaluative
gain. See DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., PRYING THE LID FROM THE BLACK Box: PLOTTING EVALUATION
STRATEGY FOR WELFARE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMS 33-36 (Institute for Research on
Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 999-93, 1993).
99. Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department of
Health and Human Services, to Russell S. Gould, Secretary, California Health and Welfare Agency (July
14, 1992) (on file with author) (approving the statewide California Welfare Reform Demonstration Project);
Letter from Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human
Services, to James G. Ledbetter, Ph.D., Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human Resources (Nov.
2, 1993) (on file with author) (approving the statewide Georgia Personal Accountability and Responsibility
demonstration project); Letter from Joseph R. Antos, Ph.D., Director, Office of Research and Demonstra-
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dents, 1 ° and three projects that impose sanctions for failure to receive appro-
priate immunizations.' 0 ' There are seven approved state waivers to run
Learnfare programs, four of which have provisions that specifically target
pregnant and parenting teens,"02 and more states continue to pass Learnfare
legislation. 1°' No Learnfare waiver requests have been denied. The only
check on how many states can test the same hypothesis seems to be whether
the state legislature will authorize the designated project."
Furthermore, demonstrations are also being approved to test previously
studied hypotheses that have been empirically disproved. For example, al-
though research has regularly shown that the level of AFDC benefits does not
tions, Health Care Financing Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, to Alan J. Gibbs,
Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Human Services (July 20, 1992) (on file with author) (approving
the statewide New Jersey Family Development Program); Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart to Gerald
Whitburn, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (April 10, 1992) (on file with
author) (approving the four-county Wisconsin Parental and Family Responsibility Demonstration Project);
Letter from Mary Jo Bane to Gerald Whitburn (Nov. 1, 1993) (on file with author) (approving Wisconsin's
two-county Work Not Welfare Demonstration Project).
100. Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department
of Health and Human Services, to Eloise Anderson, Director, California Department of Social Services
app. at 1 (Oct. 29, 1992) (on file with author) (approving the statewide California Assistance Payments
Demonstration Project); Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart to Gerald Whitburn, Secretary, Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Health and Social Services (July 27, 1992) (on file with author) (approving Wisconsin's six-county
Two Tier AFDC Benefit Demonstration Program).
101. Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department
of Health and Human Services, to James G. Ledbetter, Ph.D., Commissioner, Georgia Department of
Human Resources (Nov. 17, 1992) (on file with author) (approving the statewide Georgia Preschool
Immunization Project); Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart to Carolyn W. Colvin, Secretary, Maryland
Department of Human Resources (June 30, 1992) (on file with author) (approving the statewide Maryland
Primary Prevention Initiative); Letter from Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families,
Department of Health and Human Services, to Karen Beye, Executive Director, Colorado Department of
Social Services (Jan. 13, 1994) (on file with author) (approving the statewide Colorado Personal Responsi-
bility and Employment Program).
102. Learnfare-related waivers have been approved for California, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon,
Virginia, and Wisconsin, and waiver requests are pending for Arkansas and Oklahoma. CENTER ON SOCIAL
WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, supra note 87, at 3.
Those states with provisions targeting pregnant and parenting teens are California, Missouri, Ohio,
and Wisconsin. Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, to Russell S. Gould, Secretary, California Health and Welfare Agency
(July 14, 1992) app. at 1-2 (on file with author) (approving the statewide California Welfare Reform
Demonstration Project); Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart to Gary J. Stangler, Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Social Services (Oct. 26, 1992) (on file with author) (approving five-to-seven-school-district
program called Missouri People Attaining Self-Sufficiency); Letter from Otis R. Bowen, M.D., Secretary
of Health and Human Services, to Richard F. Celeste, Governor of Ohio (June 2, 1988) (on file with
author) (approving the statewide Ohio Transitions to Independence Program); Letter from Jo Anne B.
Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Family Support, Department of Health and Human Services, to Patricia
Goodrich, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (June 6, 1990) (on file with
author) (approving the "Learnfare Modification" to Wisconsin's statewide Welfare Reform Demonstration
project).
103. In 1993, Mississippi passed such a bill, 1993 Miss. Sess. Laws, ch. 614, and California's
legislature authorized its previously approved "Cal Learn" program, 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. 69.
Likewise, although three Family Cap experiments were currently operational, Georgia passed
legislation implementing a family cap during the 1993 session. 1993 Ga. Laws 612.
104. For example, in 1992 Learnfare proposals were introduced but not passed in 15 state legislatures.
LEVIN-EPSTEIN & GREENBERG, supra note 87, at 10.
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affect the size of AFDC families or a recipient's decision to have another
child," 5 HHS approved waivers in California, Georgia, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin to test just that hypothesis. 1" Similarly, numerous studies in a
variety of states have shown that higher AFDC benefit levels are not a signifi-
cant reason why most families move into a higher-benefit state.'o However,
in 1992, HHS approved waivers for both California and Wisconsin to allow
them to pay lower benefits to new residents in order to determine the effect
105. FAY LOMAX COOK ET AL., CONVERGENT PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY: THE
VIEWS FROM THE GENERAL PUBLIC, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND AFDC RECIPIENTS 5-40 (Center for
Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern University, 1988); JENCKS, supra note 1, at 228 n.55;
KRISTEN A. MOORE, POLICY DETERMINANTS OF TEENAGE CHILDBEARING 62 (The Urban Institute, 1980);
David T. Ellwood & Mary Jo Bane, The Impact of AFDC on Family Structure and Living Arrangements,
7 RES. LAB. ECON. 137-207 (1985); David E. Keefe, Governor Reagan, Welfare Reform, and AFDC
Fertility, 57 SOC. SERV. REV. 235 (1983); Kristin A. Moore & Steven B. Caldwell, The Effect of
Government Policies on Out-of-Wedlock Sex and Pregnancy, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 164 (1977); Mark R.
Rank, Fertility Among Women on Welfare: Incidence and Determinants, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 296 (1989).
In addition, the size of the AFDC family has been significantly declining: In 1969, 32.5% of AFDC
families had four or more children, in 1991, only 10.1% did. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 90, at 696.
106. See supra note 99.
107. For example, a 1993 Alaska survey (the state with the highest AFDC benefits in the United
States) found that 33% of new AFDC applicants came to Alaska to be with family, 31% came for work
opportunities, 13% had lived in Alaska before, 22% came for other reasons, and only 1% came for state
programs. ALASKA DEP'T OF LABOR, ALASKA ECONOMIC TRENDS 4-5 (1993); see also DEP'T OF HUMAN
SERV., WELFARE MIGRATION STUDY: A REPORT TO THE 1991 LEGISLATURE 18 (1991) (concluding that
"the AFDC-UP does not attract families to Minnesota," and that "movement in and out of the state does
not result in a significant net loss or gain for Minnesota's AFDC caseload"); NEVADA STATE WELFARE
DIV., AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM RECIPIENT CHARACTERISTICS STUDY 4 (1988) (finding
that the two most common reasons welfare recipients gave for moving to Nevada were to be with family
(49.1 %) and because of a new job (9.1%)); PLANNING AND EVALUATION DIVISION, DEP'T OF SOCIAL
WELFARE, AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN: 1990 APPLICANT SURVEY 25 (1991) (finding
that 94% of AFDC applicants surveyed had either lived in Vermont for more than one year, or had lived
there before, and that "there does not seem to be any evidence, compelling or otherwise, to indicate that
[all but one single parent] came to Vermont to get welfare benefits" and "[flamily ties are clearly the most
important reason for coming to Vermont"); STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF INCOME MAINTENANCE,
1993 MAGNET SURVEY (1993) (finding that of the 5.7% of respondents who listed higher benefits as the
reason they moved to Connecticut more than half had lived there previously); STEVE SMUCKER, FINAL
REPORT ON IMMIGRATIONTO MICHIGAN BY GA AND ADC APPLICANTS 12 (Michigan Department of Social
Services, 1982) (finding that 3.4% of all out of state applicants may have migrated to Michigan for the
benefits).
But see Rebecca M. Blank, The Effect of Welfare and Wage Levels on the Location Decisions of
Female-Headed Households, 24 J. URB. ECON. 186, 188 (1988) (finding that "locational choices of female
household heads are significantly affected by welfare-benefit levels . . . ."). However, she also finds that
"wage differentials are also important," id., and "[i]ndividuals will respond differently to changes in welfare
and wage levels depending on their ... individual characteristics." Id. at 207; see also Gary S. Fields,
Place to Place Migration: Some New Evidence, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 21, 31 (1979) (finding that welfare
and unemployment benefit levels were significant factors in determining migration flows, but "no consistent
aggregate effect of welfare on migration is found," and "[oif the factors determining migration behavior,
this research suggests that perhaps the most important variable is the availability of jobs"); Lawrence
Southwick, Jr., Public Welfare Programs and Recipient Migration, GROwTH & CHANGE, Oct. 1981, at
22 (noting that higher welfare benefits are shown to be a positive draw toward migration, although "there
are a number of nonwelfare variables which induce migration both for welfare recipients and for nonreci-
pients," and "welfare migrants seem to migrate for many of the same reasons as the nonrecipients migrate,"
id. at 24). Note also that, unlike the studies showing little correlation between welfare benefit levels and
migration patterns, none of the studies finding that welfare did have a significant impact on welfare
recipients' decisions to move actually asked recipients directly why they moved.
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on mobility decisions of paying AFDC benefits based on the previous state of
residence.l0 8 Studies specific to both of these states had already found this
hypothesis inapplicable to the majority of affected recipients."
Additionally, although one of the few restrictions mandated by section 1115
is that waivers must promote the objectives of the relevant statute, 110 demon-
strations have been approved which test no objective of the Social Security
Act. The state residency requirement of the California and Wisconsin projects
mentioned above is an example, in that discouraging people from moving
interstate does not "encourage the care of dependent children," "help maintain
and strengthen family life," or help parents "attain or retain capability for the
maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the mainte-
nance of continuing parental care and protection." 11
The evaluation format of approved projects is also faulty. Too often, these
projects are not designed to evaluate critical effects on subjects or to develop
data on models that do not involve a reduction in benefits. For example,
Wisconsin's Learnfare demonstration project ultimately provides additional
case management and alternative educational placements along with financial
disincentives. 2 Nonetheless, the evaluation model does not provide an as-
sessment of whether services without sanctions would have an impact. 3 In
108. Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department
of Health and Human Services, to Gerald Whitburn, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social
Services (July 27, 1992) (on file with author) (approving Wisconsin Two-Tier AFDC Benefit Demonstration
Proposal); Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart to Eloise Anderson, Director, California Department of Social
Services (Oct. 29, 1992) (on file with author) (approving the California Assistance Payments Demonstration
Project).
109. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN CALIFORNIA: FACTS AND FIGURES 52-54 (1984)
("The data... [does] not lend support to the theory that California has a larger percentage of its population
on AFDC because eligible families are moving to California in order to take advantage of higher grant
levels."); WISCONSIN EXPENDITURE COMM., REPORT OF THE WELFARE MAGNET STUDY COMMITTEE 50-80
(1986) (finding that only one in 683 respondents cited better welfare as the main reason for her migration,
although welfare was one of several factors for others). The California project was enjoined from
proceeding based on constitutional grounds. Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
110. Although waivers need not promote all objectives of the Social Security Act, they must further
some objective of the Act. See California Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491,497 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
112. Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Family Support, Department of Health
and Human Services, to Patricia A. Goodrich, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Human
Services, and attachments (June 1, 1990) (on file with author) (approving expansion to Learnfare demonstra-
tion).
113. Office of Family Assistance, Department of Health and Human Services, Amendments to
Wisconsin's Special Terms and Conditions for its Welfare Reform Demonstration, Part II-Learnfare
Modification, Section 5: Evaluation 7-12 (June 1, 1990) (on file with author). Likewise, the evaluation
of the Ohio Learnfare program (LEAP) notes that GRADS, a preexisting, state teen parent program, may
have helped bolster LEAP's effects. DAN BLOOM ET AL., MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH
CORPORATION, LEAP: IMPLEMENTINGA WELFARE INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AMONG
TEENAGE PARENTS 57-85 (1991). One county welfare director noted:
In our county, we have had a successful GRADS program; I firmly believe the GRADS staff
plays more of a role in keeping kids in school than the money ever will. A point that often gets
overlooked, as well, is that a lot of teen parents do not receive AFDC. In our county, the
GRADS program, for example, serves 95 students and only about 1/3 of those receive AFDC.
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addition, there are many successful dropout prevention programs for AFDC
teens that do not reduce benefits. However, no one is evaluating whether these
accomplish more than the "Learnfare" model.114 Of course, unlike the com-
monly held perception that Learnfare is cost-neutral or saves money, the drop-
out prevention programs require additional appropriations."' Likewise, ex-
periments are approved that test multiple variables without control groups for
each variable." 6 Thus, no valid assessment can be made for the effect of
each variable on the hypothesis."1 7
Most noticeably absent from virtually all the evaluations is any assessment
of the impact on the thousands of women and children who are subject to the
reduced subsistence benefits."' Rather, the focus is on government cost
savings or change in recipient behavior. "9 This is contrary to standard social
I also believe that the sanctions that have been imposed on the AFDC teen mothers have not
improved their lives nor their babies lives.
MDRC Finds LEAP Improves School Attendance, STATES UPDATE (Center for Law and Social Policy),
Apr. 26, 1993, at 7-8. Yet the LEAP evaluation did not assess the impact of GRADS independently of
the sanctions. BLOOM, supra, at 87-104.
114. W7at Do We Learn From Learnfare?, FAMILY MATTERS (Center for Law and Social Policy),
Jan. 1993, at 12-13.
115. Administrative costs for Learnfare in Wisconsin in 1991 were $7,491,614, without including costs
of litigation, state staff assigned to Learnfare, or administrative staff required for fair hearings. Id. at 13.
116. Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department
of Health and Human Services, to Russell S. Gould, Secretary, California Health and Welfare Agency (July
14, 1992) (on file with author) (approving California Welfare Reform Demonstration Project, which
imposes statewide grant reductions, lower benefits for new residents, Family Cap, Learnfare, and Workfare
provisions); Letter from Joseph R. Antos, Director, Office of Research and Demonstrations, Department
of Health and Human Services, to Alan J. Gibbs, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Human
Services (July 20, 1992) (on file with author) (approving the New Jersey Family Development Program,
which includes both Family Cap and Workfare components); Letter from Laurence J. Love, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services, to Cornelius
Hogan, Secretary, Vermont Agency of Human Services (April 12, 1993) (on file with author) (approving
the Vermont Family Independence Project, which imposes time limits for AFDC, Workfare, and require-
ments that pregnant and parenting minors live with parents or in a "supervised" setting); Letter from Mary
Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services, to
Gerald Whitburn, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (Nov. 1, 1993) (on file
with author) (approving the Wisconsin Work Not Welfare Project, which includes time-limited benefits,
a Family Cap provision, and Workfare provisions); Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart to Gerald Whitburn
(April 10, 1992) (on file with author) (approving the Wisconsin Parental and Family Responsibility Project,
which includes a Family Cap provision, as well as four different Workfare provisions).
117. WISEMAN, supra note 87, at 42 (discussing Wisconsin's Parental and Family Responsibility
Initiation), 48-49 (discussing New Jersey's Family Development Program), 50-54 (discussing California's
Welfare Reform Demonstration Project).
118. In Maryland alone, 8299 families received reduced grants in July 1993 due to the lack of
documentation of a health visit by a child six years of age or under. DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES, STATE
OF MARYLAND, DISALLOWANCES RUN DATE (July 2, 1993) (on file with author).
119. For example, Wisconsin received a waiver to study the effect of paying lower AFDC benefits
to families who had moved into the state less than six months previously. While the study plan includes
interviews to determine why the family moved into Wisconsin, it does not include any assessment of
potential hardships faced by the family as a result of receiving reduced benefits. WISCONSIN DEP'T OF
HEALTH & SOCIAL SERV., Two-TIER AFDC BENEFIT DEMONSTRATION PROJECT, APPLICATION FOR
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 25-32 (June 26, 1992) (on file with author). The Vermont Family Independence
Project imposes time limits on AFDC as well as stringent work requirements, but does not require any
study of the impact of such drastic reductions. VERMONT DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE, FAMILY INDEPEN-
DENCE PROJECT, APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE IV-49-59 (Oct. 29, 1992) (on file with author).
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science research practice, which mandates a heightened oversight when chil-
dren who cannot consent for themselves are involved. 120
In fact, it appears that in some situations waivers were granted solely as
a budget-reduction measure, raising the core question whether we are trying
to solve urban problems or only save money. California's across-the-board
5.8% AFDC reduction reputedly tested the hypothesis of whether increased
deprivation of subsistence benefits would increase work participation.12'
However, the state's waiver application highlighted the state's fiscal crisis,
predicted annual state and county savings of over $126 million for the grant
reduction provision alone, and stated an intended implementation date only
three months after the waiver request was first submitted for approval. 22 In
addition, the demonstration does not require that any job be offered or avail-
able to the recipient prior to the reduction, nor that there even be an employ-
able adult in the household."
Consistent with the rhetoric of the Reagan and Bush Administrations and
continued under President Clinton, these waiver approvals send the message
that states can reduce benefits for the entire state AFDC population on dupli-
cate hypotheses without a design that will provide useful information. This
implementation of section 1115 ignores well-established social science proce-
dures, procedures developed specifically to protect the innocent human subjects
The recent HHS approval of the Wisconsin Work Not Welfare Program, which terminates the entire AFDC
grant to families regardless of need, does not require an evaluation report until 4 1/4 years after the project
has begun. "Waiver Terms and Conditions," attachment to letter from Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary
for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services, to Gerald Whitburn, Secretary,
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, app. at 12-13, § 3.10 (Nov. 1, 1993) (on file with
author).
120. Veach, supra note 66, at 41-44.
121. Governor Pete Wilson's original proposal, which received federal § 1115 approval, would have
cut the basic benefit for all AFDC families of three by 10% immediately (with no determination of whether
anyone in the family was employable) and would have further reduced benefits by 15% six months later
for all families with an able-bodied adult. Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children
and Families, Department of Health and Human Services, to Russell S. Gould, Secretary, California Health
and Welfare Agency, app. at 4, §§ 2.2-2.3 (July 14, 1992) (approving the California Welfare Reform
Demonstration Project). Following that proposal's defeat in a voter initiative, WISEMAN, supra note 87,
at 49, the demonstration project ultimately approved, pursuant to a second waiver application, included
a 5.8% grant reduction, or $28 per month for a family of three, for all AFDC families. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERV., HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., CALIFORNIA WAIVER AUTHORITY (Oct. 29, 1992)
(on file with author). Previously, a 5.8% cut had been approved by the state legislature. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 11450.01 (1991). Of that cut, 1.3 % was contingent on the federal waiver approval, because
it violates Medicaid "maintenance of effort" requirements. Federal law prohibits states from receiving
federal Medicaid funding if they reduce AFDC benefits below the level the state paid in May 1988. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(c) (1988). The cuts were to be implemented in two phases, with the first phase, on October
1, 1992, resulting in an initial 4.5% reduction, and the second phase reducing benefits by 1.3% on
December 1, 1992. LEVIN-EPSTEIN & GREENBERG, supra note 87, at 42. The California legislature has
enacted legislation approving an additional 2.7% cut, which went into effect in September of 1993. S.B.
35, 1st Sess., 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. 828.
122. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH SERV. & DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERV., APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE, PROGRAM NARRATIVE, CALIFORNIA ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 4,
6, 9 (Sept. 16, 1992) (on file with author).
123. See supra note 97.
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of "reform" experiments. '24 These waivers do not test alternative hypotheses;
instead, they drive a huge path through the basic protections of the Social
Security Act."
IV. STATES ARE NOT THE PROPER FORUM FOR
UNRESTRICTED WELFARE REFORM
In a climate of no spending, the rush to approve cost-neutral broad-based
state demonstration projects has been heralded as the avenue to true welfare
reform. In turn, welfare reform is viewed as the mechanism to solve urban
problems.
But the underlying choice to allow states broad and essentially unrestricted
discretion to experiment with subsistence benefits is wrong. State and local
officials operate under built-in fiscal incentives to control costs as well as
political pressures arising from deep-seated myths about welfare recipients.
As a result, unrestricted discretion leads to programs that cause substantial
harm to women and children, rather than being realistically designed to solve
urban problems. 2 6
State and local governments have a strong fiscal incentive to reduce
benefits based on interstate competition for businesses and wealthy individu-
als. 12
7
The ability of jurisdictions to break the link between taxes and expenditures is limited
by the threat of relocation by highly mobile, relatively wealthy individuals. In an effort
to attract these relocators, jurisdictions offer selective tax breaks or lower the overall
124. 1 do not mean to advocate a scientific model as the only or best approach for social legislation.
I do mean, however, to raise serious doubts about the cavalier way in which HHS has changed section 1115
projects from narrow investigative experiments to sweeping social policy revisions. A scientific model with
its attendant restrictions is appropriate for experiments under § 1115, but is not necessarily required for
all major legislative initiatives.
125. In what has been termed a "political dare," Jason DeParle, Wisconsin Pledges to Take Own Path
on Welfare by '99, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at A1, Wisconsin recently enacted a provision requiring
the state to develop and submit to the legislature a complete replacement welfare program for AFDC no
later than 1995. Wis. STAT. § 49.19(20) (1993); S.B. 418, 1993 Wisconsin Act 99 §§ 64, 112. A federal
waiver would be necessary in order for the state to continue receiving its $245 million in federal reimburse-
ment. "Work, Not Welfare" Becomes Law in Wisconsin, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at A25.
126. Of course, some state governments have resisted the fiscal and political pressures described
herein, and submitted waiver requests which expanded benefits or offered fiscal incentives to effectuate
results. See supra note 89. However, this does not negate the important role of the federal government
in ensuring that states do not implement broad-based demonstration projects that are driven by fiscal and
political motivation.
127. "Many who would support a particular progressive tax and spending program in a unitary system
may oppose it in hierarchical federalism if the law preempts state 'beggar-my-neighbor' laws which benefit
these citizens." Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic,
89 J. POL. ECON. 152, 158 (1981).
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burden or progressivity of broad-based taxes. This, then, cripples the ability of the
jurisdictions to fund public goods and services through a tax system based on ability to
pay. 1
2
Although the reality of such wealth relocation is widely disputed, 129 state
policymakers' fear of this outmigration is influential in decisions regarding
state budget allocations.130 In addition, since budgetary items, like roads,
water supply, sewage, and education are considered essential to retaining
corporate personnel, less room remains in the state budget for providing
adequate welfare programs. 1 ' In fact, a "welfare reform" idea may spread
from state to state 32 not because it has merit, but because states do not want
to lose revenue to other states.'33 On the other hand, the federal government,
which need not fear driving away a revenue base, is in a much more objective
position to design welfare programs.' 34
The state's fiscal incentives to reduce benefits were heightened by the
recession of the early 1980s, which increased state fiscal stress 3 ' and re-
128. Therese J. McGuire, Federal Aid to State and Localities and the Appropriate Competitive
Framework, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 153, 155-56 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
129. H. Brinton Milward & Heidi Hosbach Newman, State Incentive Packages and the Industrial
Location Decision, 3 ECON. DEV. Q. 203, 205 (1989) (surveying the contradictory studies of whether state
tax rates affect industry movement); see also Alberta H. Charney, Intraurban Manufacturing Location
Decisions and Local Tax Differentials, 14 J. UitB. ECON. 184 (1983) (finding that high property tax rates
discourage firms from relocating to urban areas, but income tax rates result in a weak disincentive); Dick
Netzer, What Should Governors Do When Economists Tell Them That Nothing Works?, 9 N.Y. AFF. 19
(1986).
130. Harold Wolman, Local Economic Development Policy: What Explains the Divergence Between
Policy Analysis and Political Behavior?, 10 J. URB. AFF. 19, 24-27 (1988) (suggesting that local political
actors use fiscal incentives to attract industry despite empirical data showing their ineffectiveness because
(1) politicians are ignorant of empirical data, and, instead, rely on conversations with local business people
who say "taxes make an important difference," (2) the offering has symbolic content to the electorate as
a visible response to unemployment, and (3) governments try to match their competitors because they fear
the consequences if they are wrong); see also Albert Davis & Robert Lucke, The Rich-State-Poor-State
Problem in a Federal System, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 337, 341 (1982); Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and
Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 919, 949-50, 953, 964 (1985).
The flip side of that perception is the fear that if a state provides an adequate AFDC program there
will be an influx of poor people to the state. Although questionable, see supra note 107, this belief likewise
would deter states from requesting waivers that increase benefits. Stewart, supra at 926 n.20.
131. Harold A. Hovey, Interstate Tax Competition and Economic Development, in REFORMING STATE
TAX SYSTEMS 89, 96-97 (Steven D. Gold ed., 1986).
132. See discussion of numerous states testing the same demonstration hypotheses, supra text
accompanying notes 98-104.
133. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 127, at 158. The additional factor of wide disparities in states' rev-
enue capacity and resources argues against decentralization of categorical eligibility, creating an incentive
for poorer states or states with a fiscal deficit to reduce eligibility. See Davis & Lucke, supra note 130,
at 340-41, 345, 351-52.
134. Stewart, supra note 130, at 951. Helen F. Ladd& Fred C. Doolittle, Which Level of Government
Should Assist the Poor?, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 323, 328-29 (1982).
135. Ladd & Doolittle, supra note 134, at 329 (finding that "with decentralized financing, increasing
welfare burdens at a time of recession would require states to raise taxes in a cyclically counter-productive
manner"); see also Steven D. Gold, The State Fiscal Agenda for the 1990s (National Conference of State
Legislatures 1990), quoted in Robert Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty:
An Alternative View, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 451 n.22 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
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duced federal infusion of money to fund state programs.a 6 In addition, the
Reagan/Bush section 1115 waiver policy required all demonstrations to be cost-
neutral, 137 and provided that any overage be borne totally by the states. 131
States therefore had a powerful incentive to reduce benefits or to run programs
with short-term savings results; they had no fiscal motivation to test demonstra-
tions with early costs (e.g., more expensive education/training programs) but
potential long-term savings. 13
Moreover, state and local public officials, traditionally closer to their
constituents, are more subject to the electorate's political whims and therefore
have often been less willing to implement programs that protect and support
minority, disenfranchised, and unpopular constituencies."
Today, of course, welfare recipients are becoming the focus of much
popular anger. The vast majority of the current American electorate views
welfare recipients as African-American urban ghetto-dwellers who are lazy,
dysfunctional mothers, having many children to avoid work and to get wel-
fare.' This erroneous, I42 racist image is a key reason for welfare's unpop-
ularity. 43 It also explains why many of the state demonstration projects
1991) (noting that from 1976 to 1989, as state spending for Medicaid health care costs skyrocketed, state
spending for other benefit programs including AFDC plunged).
136. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE
AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 159-63 (1992).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 48-57.
138. Michael Wiseman, Welfare Reform in the States: The Bush Legacy, 15 Focus 18, 19 (1993).
Likewise, any savings could be returned to the states. See discussion of savings return in New Jersey
REACH program, Garansky & Barnow, supra note 49, at 629.
139. Garasky & Barnow, supra note 49, at 626; Wiseman, supra note 138, at 20.
140. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, local officials were notoriously unwilling to assist in school
desegregation efforts. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1958) (finding state officials' hostility to racial
desegregation of schools no defense to failure to implement plan); GEORGE METCALF, FROM LITTLE ROCK
TO BOSTON: THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1983); J. BRAIN SHEEHAN, THE BOSTON SCHOOL
INTEGRATION DISPUTE: SOCIAL CHANGE AND LEGAL MANEUVERS (1984). See lengthy litigation in Chicago
against local housing authorities which culminated in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 287 n.4 (1976)
(documenting mechanism used by local officials to perpetuate discriminatory public housing scheme). See
also JOEL F. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR: WELFARE POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND MORALITY 135
(1972).
141. RUTH SIDEL, WOMAN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT
AMERICA 11 (1986); TOM W. SMITH, ETHNIC IMAGES (1990).
142. Only 38.8% of AFDC recipients in 1991 were African-American. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra
note 90, at 697. AFDC families have no more children than two-parent families in the general population.
Id. at 696. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1991 (1992). See note 105, supra, for studies
showing that AFDC mothers do not have more children in order to increase their grant levels; see also
Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS
235, 251-52 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (stating that less than nine percent of all
poor lived in ghettos in 1979). "It has been estimated that only one poor child in fifty-six is African-Amer-
ican, born of an unmarried teen mother who dropped out of school, and lives in the central city." Corbett,
supra note 1, at 8 (citing Ronald B. Mincy, The Underclass: Concept, Controversy, and Evidence, Paper
Presented at IRP-ASPE Conference on Poverty and Public Policy (May 1992)).
143. Both our historical ambivalence about financially assisting the poor and our current frustration
that we have not solved poverty add to this unpopularity. Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their
Immortality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1509, 1543-44 (1991); Williams, supra note 53, at
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attempt to use reductions in AFDC benefits to change the recipient's behavior
that is viewed as the cause of broad-based urban problems. '44 State and local
politicians know that they can increase their popularity by inflammatory
rhetoric1 45 and political action that blames welfare recipients for their own
situations and thereby permits reduction of benefits.'" This seems true even
when increased expenditures might result in programs that would reduce
welfare costs in the long-run.147
Indeed, AFDC was nationalized in 1935 partly because local government
units were simply not providing sufficient benefits. 48 The reality of local
political and economic pressures was recognized as early as the hearings prior
to enacting section 1115 initially: "[IUt is helpful to the sound administration
of State welfare programs to have basic standards written into the Federal law
as a protection against temporary and local pressures. 1149
721-25, 741-46.
144. While we might think of local control as giving a voice to people's public issues and fantasize
local involvement in design of a welfare program as a means of increasing citizen support, people really
focus on their private agendas, such as keeping poor people out of their neighborhoods and schools. See
generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Parr I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1990).
Localist ideology masks local power and hides the privatization of local public life behind the
rhetoric of efficiency, participation, community and local self-determination. The contingency
of local authority, the linkage of location to wealth, class, race and status and the parochial nature
of local political activity are obscured by the nostalgia for the polis and the New England town
and by abstract assumptions about the marketplace for municipal services.
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part ll-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 346, 452
(1990).
Although local involvement in the design of a welfare program might increase citizen support, the
current degree of unreality and political hysteria at a local level about welfare recipients leads to poorly
designed reactive programs.
145. "However, the problem with the political incentives created by the waiver option is that most
of the political benefits appear to come from the announcement, not the implementation, or indeed the
impact, of the reform . . . . As a result, such projects . . . are likely to be driven largely by front-end
effects unless encouraged by specific federal initiative or other external factors." WISEMAN, supra note
87, at 43. Of course, a federal presence is not a federal panacea. The same myths and biases have infused
our national debate regarding welfare reform as well.
146. Richard A. Cloward & Frances Fox Piven, Punishing the Poor, Again: The Fraud of Workfare,
1993 NATION 693, 696; see WISEMAN, supra note 87, at 23, 43 (discussing conflicts between the politics
of demonstration and policy science, and concluding that the need to address political dissatisfaction with
the welfare system leads to poorly designed programs).
147. Data from the implementation of the Family Support Act shows that states are not appropriating
the state match to obtain the federal funding for the major welfare reform which occurred in 1988. In 1992,
states drew down only 65.5% of the available federal matching funds. 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 90,
at 634.
148. The Report of the Committee on Economic Security, submitted to President Franklin D. Roosevelt
in 1935, made recommendations leading to the Social Security Act, noting that:
Less than one-half of the local units authorized to grant mothers' aid are actually doing so. Many
others are granting amounts insufficient to defend the children involved. Part of this situation is due
to indifference, but in part it is due to the poverty of many local governmental units ....
PROJECT ON THE FEDERAL SOCIAL ROLE, THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF
1935, 36 (1985).
149. Hearings, supra note 17, at 289 (statement of Clark W. Blackburn, General Director, Family
Service Association of America) (testifying in opposition to § 107 of the Act, allowing states to do vendor
payments when the state has reason to believe that the money is not being used in the best interest of the
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 12:8, 1994
In short, contrary to the presumptions underlying the current trend, °50
state and local governments are not in the best position to undertake bold
welfare reform."' This is not to say that there should be no waivers for state
experimentation. Using states as laboratories to experiment with small,
statistically significant groups is one way to gather empirical data on im-
provements in the welfare system. But there must be a strong federal presence
in the design, limitations, and analysis of these waiver requests. 5 2 To serve
that function, the federal executive must have clear nonpartisan standards for
judging waiver requests, 53 analyzing the empirical data to determine if the
premise being tested is sound, defining a base benefit under which no state
may fall, and providing for an independent determination of harm and need
for informed consent.15 4
child); see also id. at 551 (statement of Joseph Reid, Executive Director, Child Welfare League of America)
(testifying that "there is danger in simply giving a blank check to the States," since "there is ample
experience which shows that there has been serious abuse by States in some instances by cutting off large
numbers of people from relief rolls quite inconsistent with Federal law."). Thus, contrary to the statement
of Rep. Atkins, supra note 51, when the stakes are the total subsistence benefits of a mother and children,
perhaps there is some wisdom to lengthy discussion and assessment in Washington of a proposed change
rather than a quick state experiment.
150. Even leading welfare policy analyst David Ellwood, now Assistant Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation at HHS, although recognizing that "we simply do not have all the answers about how to
transform the welfare system," recommends that states be allowed to phase in never-before-tried major
welfare programs:
The politics of the Congress and the uncertainty about the impact and appropriateness of various
changes will force a national program to be pale and cautious. But some states will be willing to be
quite bold. From them, we can learn about a true transformation of the welfare system.
David T. Ellwood, Major Issues in Time-Limited Welfare 25 (Dec. 2, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
151. Nor does Congress always function analytically. For a discussion of the complexities of the
congressional process in enacting social legislation, see Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State:
The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1549 (1983). 1 am of course aware of the ongoing
federalism debate about the appropriate allocation of power and responsibility in our constitutional system.
My purpose here is to criticize the wholesale federal abdication in the § 1115 context. In future articles,
I plan to explore more fully how notions of dual or concurrent federalism would play out in the welfare
framework.
152. WISEMAN, supra note 87, at 11 ("But if there is no larger context of motivation and support for
state demonstrations and no sense of what does and does not fit in the 'big picture,' then it is likely that
the agenda for reform will be driven solely by state political and fiscal considerations."); see also Robert
Greenstein, supra note 135, at 438, 440 (arguing that targeted benefit programs are more likely to succeed
when they are federally prescribed and funded entitlement programs, noting that the Reagan federal budget
cuts in benefits programs in 1981 virtually ceased after 1982 and in many cases began to expand thereafter).
153. In one challenge to a § 1115 waiver, the court noted that the agency's approval pattern should
not be used to modify the plain meaning of the statute:
[lilt seems quite plain that the sort of experimental projects which are going to be approved may be
much more closely related to the political and sociological orientation or general policy, of the
Administration then in power than with its understanding of what the statute authorizes.
California Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (emphasis added).
154. HHS has long argued that such a requirement would preclude any experiments which involve
a decrease in benefits. Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 547 (N.D. Ga. 1976). However, as the court
in Crane noted, there are ways to devise "incentives to encourage the necessary number of individuals for
an experimental sample to consent to participate in a section 1115 project involving diminution of benefits."
Id. at 547; see also New York State's Child Assistance Program (offering work incentives, assistance with
child support enforcement, and case management and counseling), and the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment (randomly assigning families to one of 14 experimental insurance plans, at various levels of
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V. CONCLUSION
Originally, policymakers intended for section 1115 to serve as a vehicle
to run demonstrations. These demonstrations were to be limited in scope and
were to be designed to improve the situation of recipients. These goals are
consistent with the standards considered essential for experimentation in the
social science world and should once again serve as the cornerstones of HHS
waiver policy. 155
By interpreting section 1115 waivers overbroadly, HHS has undermined
congressionally mandated eligibility criteria and, in so doing, has corrupted
the sensitive federalism balance between national and local authority. That
balance must be arrived at by legislative consensus, and we cannot allow one
agency to corrupt or undercut it. Broad-based state experimentation without
adequate evaluative processes and protections for those whose lives are being
disrupted is little more than a simplistic political response to the electorate's
hostility to welfare recipients. It is not an honest attempt to solve underlying
urban problems.
expense). In both cases, participants gave their consent to be part of the project. WILLIAM L. HAMILTON
ET AL., THE NEW YORK CHILD ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: PROGRAM IMPACTS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS 3-24
(ABT Associates Inc., 1993); Kathleen N. Lohr, et al., Use of Medical Care in the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment: Diagnosis-and Service-Specific Analyses in a Randomized Controlled Trial, 24(2) MED. CARE
S1, S4 (1986 Supp.).
155. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDI-
CAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SUMMING UP: FINAL REPORT ON STUDIES OF THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 65-76 (1983). "[l1t is the judgment
of the Commission that Federal agencies should take seriously their responsibility to assure that the integrity
of subjects participating in such research is respected and that the research is conducted in a way that will
provide valid answers to important questions about the cost and effectiveness of federally sponsored
programs." Abram, supra note 76, at 3.
